THE TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Ian Brownlie
I have no particular thesis on the teaching of international law. I think
that the type of syllabus varies enormously. If one is dealing with postgraduate work, then one's decision is based on whether one wants a
tightly knit, one-year examination-based LL.M. for postgraduates with
little time to spare, or whether one wants some high-grade, ambitious,
D.Phil. thesis-based structure. So many conceptions of what one wants
exist; so many different types of customer exist; and this is true of both
the United Kingdom and the United States and Canada. So I do not
like models and caricatures as substitutes for the complications of life.
On the other hand, we have to discuss matters in terms of some sort of
generalization if only to save time. So I am going to perpetrate a few
generalizations.
I do not overall like the dichotomy between English and American
style which has been referred to today. I do not say that it does not exist.
I think it is a question of emphasis and degree. One thinks of the United
States in terms of international law that it is a large place; it has many
institutions, and one thinks of a diversity of people. One thinks of
McDougal, Bishop, Baxter, Falk. Falk is in some ways both technicaland policy-oriented. There is, if you like, a spectrum of ways of handling
law and policy, and whilst one hears of the Yale School a great deal,
and perhaps one overreacts to the Yale School, there are, as I say, a
number of other American authors and also a judge (Jessup) who are
just as orthodox as the English. Just as on this side of the Atlantic there
are a number of people who, with or without an apparatus of concepts,
are nevertheless conscious of policy issues. I do not like the notion of a
sharp contrast.
I warmed to the general spirit of Richard Falk's contribution this
morning, to this extent: that if one looks to see what is characteristic of
the United States, then one learns about oneself. There is some value in
making comparisons, certainly, but I think we have certain shared problems, and these problems all stem from a tendency towards parochialism. I do not want to explain the possible reasons, particularly in the
United Kingdom, for increasing parochialism in all sorts of spheres, nor
am I content to be told that there is considerable Anglo-American cooperation, that there is great talk about the Common Market, and so on.
I am not sure that that is good enough. I think that a "club" atmosphere
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amongst five or six states can be just as parochial vis-'-vis the great wide
world as single-state parochialism; there is no nice sharp line between
internationalism and parochialism. There are at least two major recent
works in the English literature which are perfectly content-and this is
their very object-to present the rules in terms of the judicial decisions
and to a lesser extent the practice. The emphasis is on municipal courts
of about five states doing things. This is a more parochial approach than
Oppenheim; it is a more parochial approach than Hall (whose final
edition by Pearce Higgins appeared in 1924); it is a more parochial
approach than Wheaton. It really concerns me that one can have this
situation: that brand-new books can appear in the last ten years with
this sort of general standpoint.
So whether we are British or American, and whichever general approach we have to the teaching of international law, my simple message
is: Avoid parochialism. This is the duty of the teacher. He does not have
to agree with what the Ruritanians do; he does not have to agree with
what the General Assembly does; he does not even have to agree with
unanimous resolutions of the General Assembly. But he should have the
decency to report them to his students. There is a great tendency at the
moment for some people to avoid reporting what they do not like. We
all have our particular standpoints and our preferences, and it may be
very difficult to eliminate these from our teaching, but there are certain
"mechanical" safeguards that one can take, and one of them is reporting: just reporting what goes on in the world at large, and not simply
what a particular group of states does. It does not make it any better if
your parochialism is that of Douglas-Home or George Brown or Brezhnev or Rogers or whomever.
I have already dealt with my view that the dichotomy or divergence
point can be overstressed. But I would like to pursue that a little further.
We have been talking about international law and attitudes towards it.
It is quite common among American lawyers, it seems to me, to misreport what English courts do. English judges, we know, are easy targets
for accusations of gross conservatism. But it is the case that English
courts do pay great attention to policy. In Oxford one has to teach a
variety of subjects, and one of the subjects I teach is administrative law.
Well, one cannot spend very long with that subject without being aware
of the enormous freedom which the courts have in approaching various
large issues, affecting Ministers' powers, and so on. In Sweet v. Parsley,'
'[1970] A.C. 132 (1969).
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which is the House of Lords' authority on the defintion of crimes of
strict liability, the leader for the appellant was on her feet for 2 I/2 days
dealing with an issue on which there were no binding authorities (the
House of Lords can do as they please); their Lordships were fed with
the relevant authorities or useful cases, but what they were interested in,
in argument, was policy-the whole position of managers of flats whose
tenants smoked cannabis. They were not interested in a particular Oxfordshire farmhouse; they were interested in the extrapolation from that
to the Greater London Council, to the managers of hundreds of thousands of flats. The whole matter was based on policy-what would
happen if. . . ? -and a lot of cross-questioning, on practical points.
I would agree that there is a difference of emphasis between British
and American approaches. This is enhanced by the Englishman's conception of the Supreme Court in the United States, of course, which has
a special role. However, if you ignore the Supreme Court position, which
is a special one, the behavior of the two sets of courts is not perhaps so
radically different.
I think also that, so far as there are objective differences between
English and American teaching, some of these stem from, as it were,
genuine differences, not differences of approach, but of underlying differences, differences of geography. International law in the United States
is mainly taught in graduate law schools to large classes, where it would
be strange if the teaching methods were not rather different to those of
the typical, relatively small undergraduate law course in the United
Kingdom. The differences are, I think, traceable simply to the rather
different conditions in which people are taught in English institutions
and American (apparently, though superficially parallel) institutions.
One can make other points about the contrast between the casemethod approach and the textbook approach to teaching.
Now, a lot has been said about the relevancy of policy, and it seems
to me clearly that the teacher should bring policy in. The question is:
How does one do this?
If one's students are at all mature and well informed, then one can to
some extent surely assume that they have the sort of framework vis-Avis the higher levels of policy about the interests of underdeveloped
countries, the ideological clash between East and West, and so on, that
they have their own choices, and at least one should not have to put that
sort of policy background to them.
Secondly, I think that a lower level policy is a very useful, practical
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part of instruction simply in explaining the motivations of states. In fact,
closer reference to policy Tnotivation might lead simply to better factual
information.
A good illustration is the persistent misreporting in the Anglo-Saxon
literature of the Latin-American claims, by Peru and the others, to 200mile limits. This is persistently referred to in Colombos and many other
contexts as claims to a territorial sea. Now, it does not follow that they
are lawful on this account. They were in fact claims to fishery conservation zones, though the position may well have changed in view of the
Montevideo Declaration of 1970.2 At any rate my example refers to the
period from 1952 until quite recently, and the point I wish to make is as
follows: If close attention had been paid to the motivation of the Latin
Americans, then there would have been a straightforward report of what
in fact they were doing: they were not claiming a territorial sea; they
were claiming a fishery conservation zone of 200 miles. The policy point
which it is important to make is that, just as the United States had on
a unilateral basis originally started to protect particular interests by
continental shelf claims in 1945, the Latin Americans, having a different
sort of interest in the fish of the epicontinental waters, thought (as it
happened, they were wrong) that they could make a similar "special
interest" claim. We know that the difference was that the continental
shelf development got taken up generally, and it was, I think, a very
successful accommodation of the interest of the user of the sea and the
exploitation of mineral resources.
I am not, as it happens, from a policy basis personally in favor of the
Latin-American claim. But I am simply emphasizing this point, that it
would be as well if teachers did bring policy considerations in, in order
to explain the motivations of governments. Some particular developments have to be evaluated, and to evaluate them correctly one at least
wants to know what the governments thought they were doing. It makes
a great difference if they thought they were creating a fishery conservation zone as opposed to creating a territorial sea of 200 miles.
I think, in general, that one ought to be cautious in bringing policy
considerations in, particularly the larger sort. By the larger sort I mean
reference to polarization, between North, South, East, and West, the
underdeveloped countries and the others. When I say that-this is not
directed towards Professor McDougal particularly-it is directed to all
2

Declaration of Montevideo on Law of the Sea, May 8, 1970, reprintedin 9
1081 (1970).
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of us who at some time or other indulge in these generalizations, and
that includes me. But the point is this: If you look at the Barcelona
Traction Case 3 that is a very useful reminder that a large number of
states occupy both roles; they are both exporters of capital and importers
of capital-Spain, Italy, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada,
and a large number of states are of both kinds. Therefore in looking at
the Barcelona Traction Case, although there is some evidence, if you
like, of certain well-known conflicts of interest that do follow the simpler
generalization, the position cannot really be explained in simple terms.
So if you are bringing the student to look at policy issues, I think one
wants to be careful not to sow his mind with a form of theology which
is too general, as it were, to be of much value.
Another illustration would be the situation where an Afro-Asian state
makes a 12-mile claim or a claim to a continental shelf, which is in some
way a novelty, the common point being that such states tend to emphasize the coastal states' rights. If one happens to know the inner history
of such claims, they are, in some cases at least, prompted by the interests
of the local company which is the concessionaire, and which actually
prompts the coastal state to do this for the better health, economically,
both of itself and the concession-holding company.
So what I am saying is: Policy-fine; but be careful how it is done.
It can in fact become a sort of theology too general to be of much use.
Another reservation I would like to make about the use of policy in
reference to teaching is this: The kind of policy reference I do not like is
the one that too readily brings in special circumstances. This is where I
am in some danger of misreading Professor McDougal. What is called
a contextual approach to my way of thinking encourages unilateralism.
It encourages the view that by reason of special policy considerations
one breaks away from the rule. Now, the rule may be a pretty poor
thing; it may be poorly formulated; it may even be based on some rather
outdated conception of policy, but it may at least be a rule for the time
being maintaining some sort of stability. When one gets the Canadians
or whoever happens to provide the latest example of, if you like, a form
of practical contextual analysis, where they say, "We have special policy
reasons including the uncertainty of the law," and so on, in declaring a
100-mile, antipollution-jurisdiction zone in the Arctic, then this sort of
development is more easily rationalized by a certain type of policy interpretation which emphasizes the special circumstances, talks about base
'Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case, [1970] I.C.J. 3.

102

GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. 2, Supp. 2: 91

values, which are a sophisticated way of referring to the necessities of a
particular state, and as a consequence encourages unilateralism. It is in
considering Professor McDougal's applications of his theory to particular cases that I find reservations. On all other :scores, although I would
not share his apparatus of concepts, I would usually accept his results.
I would think, for example, that in an area in which I am interested, the
law of the sea, McDougal and Burke give a better picture of what is
happening and what it is all about and are infinitely more intelligent than
Colombos, who is a good example of what is an authority on the law of
the sea, and has been translated into many languages. Yet McDougal
and Burke really tell one what it is all about and lead one to expect
further developments.
It is, however, this point of contextual analysis as applied in certain
situations which I think is a sophisticated invitation to a certain type of
unilateralism.

